One of the most innovative and brilliant philosophers of his generation, but largely neglected until he was brought to public attention by Gilles Deleuze, Gilbert Simondon presents a challenge to nearly every category and method of traditional philosophy. Psychic and Collective Individuation is undoubtedly Simondon's most important work and its influence, clearly felt in Stiegler and DeLanda, has continued to grow. David Scott provides the first full introduction to this work, which will inspire as well as instruct philosophers (...) working in Continental thought, philosophy of science, social theory and political philosophy. (shrink)

Research indicates that the well‐being and productivity of over 100 million people in the global workforce may be compromised by posttraumatic stress (PTS). Given that work‐related experiences are often the source of the trauma that leads to PTS, and that PTS due to any cause can interfere with employees’ job performance, organizations would do well to consider the antecedents and consequences of PTS. This review of research—primarily within fields adjacent to business—on the types, antecedents, consequences, and organizational implications of PTS (...) is presented to advance inquiry within the field of business. The definition of PTS requires attention to the new classification of complex posttraumatic stress disorder that can result from threats that are not life‐threatening such as bullying and sexual harassment. PTS antecedents include organizational and extraorganizational traumas, and risk and resilience factors. Absenteeism, impaired cognitive functioning, strained relationships, and growth are among the consequences of PTS. Organizations can assist through disaster planning, empathetic leaders, mental health literacy initiatives, and employee assistance programs. Many research questions arise that, when answered, will allow organizations to better understand how they can improve employee productivity and well‐being by attending to PTS. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 38.4 (2000) 503-528 [Access article in PDF] Occasionalism and Occasional Causation in Descartes' Philosophy David Scott University of Victoria According to Descartes, the physical world's contact with the mind is through the sense organs and the brain, although the mechanics of this contact is by no means clear. Indeed, for many the idea that the physical world can act upon the (...) mind at all is a complete mystery on Descartes' principles, not least because the difference between the spatial and divisible nature of body and the non-spatial and indivisible nature of mind seems to preclude the possibility of body-mind contact or of a mechanism for such contact.1 Despite this, however, Descartes repeatedly affirms that body and mind interact causally. He claims that the fact of their disparate natures poses no special difficulty, and he even affirms that the mind and body can form a union (in the case of the human being).2In this paper I wish to examine two issues pertaining to the body-mind relation in Descartes' philosophy. First, I ask whether Descartes advances body-mind occasionalism: is there evidence in his writings of the view that bodies are not genuine causes of sensations, but are mere 'occasions' for God's production of sensations? Recently, it has been urged that Descartes begins his career as a body-mind causal interactionist, but perhaps ends as an occasionalist.3 [End Page 503] In Section 1 of what follows I argue against this. I attempt to show both that Descartes never strays from the body-mind interactionism which he is generally thought to espouse, and that he would undermine his proof of the material world if he did. The second issue I deal with concerns a position closely related to occasionalism which Steven Nadler has recently identified as body-mind "occasional causation."4 In Section 2 of the following I provide an interpretation of occasional causation as it appears in Descartes' reply to Regius in the Comments on a Certain Broadsheet. I argue that Descartes' occasional causation amounts to a form of interactionism which I term "inefficacious body-mind transmissionism." 1. Does Descartes Espouse Body-Mind Occasionalism? 1.1. Daniel Garber's Case for Descartes' Move Toward Body-Mind Occasionalism Occasionalism, roughly defined, is a doctrine according to which God's will is the only genuine efficient or productive cause that exists, and all other so-called 'causes' are really just 'occasions' for the exercise of that will.5 As Daniel Garber understands the term in "Descartes and Occasionalism," an occasional cause is "a cause whose effect is produced through the activity of God," and not through the exercise of any causal power within finite things.6 Body-mind occasionalism is a logical inevitability in Descartes' philosophy, Garber claims, because for Descartes "God is responsible for all motion in the inanimate world."7 The idea is that because there is no causal action on the part of bodies, bodies cannot act causally on anything, let alone minds.8Because for Garber body-body occasionalism is "as clear as anything" in Descartes' philosophy, he sets out to find evidence in Descartes' writings for [End Page 504] the body-mind occasionalism which it implies. It is Garber's case for body-mind occasionalism that I contest below, where I argue that Descartes remains a body-mind interactionist throughout his life. Clearly, my assessment of Descartes puts me at odds with Garber's more general view that Descartes is a body-body occasionalist, at least on the assumption that Descartes has a logically consistent position on body-body and body-mind causation. For, to reiterate Garber's point, to be logically consistent overall Descartes cannot be both a body-body occasionalist and a body-mind interactionist. Of course, Garber and I need not be at odds on body-body occasionalism; for since we need not assume that Descartes is logically consistent, he and I could say that Descartes as a matter of historical fact holds both positions. Within the confines of... (shrink)

This volume offers a critical appreciation of the work of 16 leading curriculum theorists through critical expositions of their writings. Written by a leading name in Curriculum Studies, the book includes a balance of established curriculum thinkers and contemporary curriculum analysts from education as well as philosophy, sociology and psychology. With theorists from the UK, the US and Europe, there is also a spread of political perspectives from radical conservatism through liberalism to socialism and libertarianism. Theorists included are: John Dewey, (...) Lev Vygotsky, Ralph Tyler, Joseph Schwab, Jerome Bruner, Maxine Greene, Basil Bernstein, Micheal Foucault, Paul Hirst, Donald Schon, Lawrence Stenhouse, Elliott Eisner, John White, Michael Apple, Henry Giroux and Robin Usher. This book is ideal for students looking for an introduction to some of the key educational thinkers of our time. It can also be used as a companion volume to the Routledge four-volume set on Curriculum Theory , 2003, which is also edited by David Scott. (shrink)

Introduction and initial thoughts -- Critical realism and empirical research methods in education -- Resolving the quantitative-qualitative divide -- Epistemic relativism, ontological realism, and the possibility of judgemental rationality -- Educational judgements : epistemic, parasitic and external criteria -- Judgemental rationality -- Empirical indicators and causal narratives -- Structure and agency : key ontological concepts -- Educational critique -- Arbitrary and non-arbitrary knowledge.

In these series of letters which David Scott wrote to Stuart Hall following his death Scott characterizes Hall's voice and his practice of speaking, listening, and generosity as the foundational elements of Hall's intellectual work.".

DIVUses C.L.R. James’sThe Black Jacobins as a jumping-off point for a reconsideration of colonial and postcolonial concepts of history, politics, and agency./div.

While typically unapologetic in expressing admiration, notably Gilles Deleuze admits his concern one time, in passing, that Gilbert Simondon's thought might hide a pernicious kind of ‘disguised moralism’, in which the form of the transcendent lurks, the enemy of the philosophy of immanence. Might there in fact be an ulterior motive in Deleuze's concern? But might this potential critique invite its own reversal? That is, might Deleuze's accusation be in fact a strategy for teasing out what, perhaps, is unrecognisable as (...) such, but structurally essential for how Simondon constructs his onto-epistemological goals? Moreover, might this Simondonian response, unmasked, not only deflect but anticipate a ‘critique’ like Deleuze's? Extending this question further reveals I believe the implications for Simondon's ‘ethics without morality’, bringing him closer to Deleuze's interpretation of Spinoza. As a result, Deleuze's ‘critique’ invites the question: ‘What exactly is Spinozan in Simondon's ethics?’ Such a question compels our re-evaluation of humanism, its underlying prerogatives, if now in light of its consequences, the re-evaluation of poststructuralism: first, because it is predicated on the critique of the humanistic subject and, second, because ‘poststructuralism’ has come to designate how Simondon's relatedness is determined to Deleuze. (shrink)

Angelaki, Volume 16, Issue 2, Page 175-180, June 2011.

The subject of this paper is Malebranche’s relation to Descartes on the question of method. Using recent commentary as a springboard, it examines whether Malebranche advances a nonpsychologistic account of method, in contrast to the psychologism typically thought to characterize the Cartesian view. I explore this question with respect to two issues of central importance to method generally: doubt and free will. My argument is that, despite superficial differences of emphasis, Descartes and Malebranche adopt positions on doubt and free will (...) that effectively ensure that their respective accounts of method aresubstantially the same. (shrink)

Much education research takes place under a convenient but spurious assumption that there is a common purpose to education research, and a common epistemology. This book takes a clear-sighted and perceptive look at the underlying truths of education research, and in refining our understanding of the subject paves the way to improving our methods and practice. It addresses the theoretical conceptual elements educational discourses that inform most debates about educational research, including: education and its relationship to research; the problems and (...) possibilities of quantification; and the diversity of methods researchers can use to create theory. In a second section the book explores these issues as they relate to a number of current and controversial debates in education, such as: researching school effectiveness; the study of curriculum, policy, sociology and anthropology; and the role of post-modern though in debates on education. (shrink)

What was distinctive about the evil of the transatlantic slave trade and New World slavery? In what ways can the present seek to rectify such historical wrongs, even while recognizing that they lie beyond repair? Irreparable Evil explores the legacy of slavery and its moral and political implications, offering a nuanced intervention into debates over reparations. David Scott reconsiders the story of New World slavery in a series of interconnected essays that focus on Jamaica and the Anglophone Caribbean. (...) Slavery, he emphasizes, involved not only scarcely imaginable brutality on a mass scale but also the irreversible devastation of the ways of life and cultural worlds from which enslaved people were uprooted. Colonial extraction shaped modern capitalism; plantation slavery enriched colonial metropoles and simultaneously impoverished their peripheries. To account for this atrocity, Scott examines moral and reparatory modes of history and criticism, probing different conceptions of evil. He reflects on the paradoxes of seeking redress for the specific moral evil of slavery, criticizing the limitations of liberal rights-based arguments for reparations that pursue reconciliation with the past. Instead, this book argues, in making the urgent demand for reparations, we must acknowledge the fundamental irreparability of a wrong of such magnitude. (shrink)

Michel Foucault continues to be regarded as one of the most essential thinkers of the twentieth century. A brilliantly evocative writer and conceptual creator, his influence is clearly discernible today across nearly every discipline-philosophy and history, certainly, as well as literary and critical theory, religious and social studies, and the arts. This volume exploits Foucault's insistent blurring of the self-imposed limits formed by the disciplines, with each author in this volume discovering in Foucault's work a model useful for challenging not (...) only these divisions but developing a more fundamental interrogation of modernism. Foucault himself saw the calling into question of modernism to be the permanent task of his life's work, thereby opening a path for rethinking the social. Understanding Foucault, Understanding Modernism shows, on the one hand, that literature and the arts play a fundamental structural role in Foucault's works, while, on the other hand, it shifts to the foreground what it presumes to be motivating Foucault: the interrogation of the problem of modernism. To that end, even his most explicitly historical or strictly epistemological and methodological enquiries directly engage the problem of modernism through the works of writers and artists from de Sade, Mallarmé, Baudelaire to Artaud, Manet, Borges, Roussel, and Bataille. This volume, therefore, adopts a transdisciplinary approach, as a way to establish connections between Foucault's thought and the aesthetic problems that emerge out of those specific literary and artistic works, methods, and styles designated “modern.” The aim of this volume is to provide a resource for students and scholars not only in the fields of literature and philosophy, but as well those interested in the intersections of art and intellectual history, religious studies, and critical theory. (shrink)

In a popular paper, Bruce Russell argues that our nonperception of divine reasons for apparently pointless suffering justifies belief in the nonexistence of God. Russell generally accepts the common interpretive norm that we are justified in believing that something does not exist when we do not perceive it, if and only if we have reason to believe that we would perceive it if it did exist. However, on the strength of an example from the film The Matrix, Russell argues that (...) this interpretive norm does not apply to the belief in God’s nonexistence based on our nonperception of reasons that would justify apparently pointless suffering. My paper undermines Russell’s effort to restrict the scope of this interpretive norm. It thereby leaves open the door to agnosticism. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty et Deleuze demandent « Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? »La naïveté de la pensée et l’innocence de la questionLa philosophie doit reconnaître que son obligation pressante à l’égard de « l’histoire souterraine du problème du monde » implique qu’elle affronte les conditions de sa propre détermination. En d’autres termes, l’historicité de la philosophie est l’histoire du « monde » en tant qu’il devient problématique. Mais ce devenir problématique « n’appartient pas à l’histoire ». Dans la pensée de Merleau-Ponty comme dans (...) celle de Deleuze, est à l’oeuvre une historicité qui refl ète la genèse du problème du « monde » en tant que l’être problématique de l’ontogenèse. Je soutiendrai que Merleau-Ponty et Deleuze cristallisent la thématique qui est déjà en germe chez Fink : le problème du monde contraint la pensée à se confronter à sa pratique. Toute philosophie se trouve comme nue face à sa propre naïveté en cherchant un rapprochement avec le monde. Dans le retour vers le monde, le philosophe est contraint de mettre sa pensée en rapport avec la naïveté qui la nourrit. Mais inversement, le philosophe doit admettre le rôle intrinsèque joué par la naïveté dans la pensée elle-même, dans sa pratique philosophique propre. Ce faisant, le statut philosophique de la naïveté se trouve confirmé. Le problème du monde est dès lors le problème philosophique de la construction d’un plan pour orienter notre pensée sur larelation entre la connaissance et l’être. Par là, on a identifi é le parallélisme épistémicoontologique structurant la question « Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? », que posent et à laquelle répondent nos deux philosophes. C’est pourquoi la présente étude soutient que c’est par la répétition philosophique du chemin par lequel le « monde » prend le statut d’un problème ontologique qu’un seuil épistémologique se trouve exposé. Le monde requiert du philosophe qu’il retrouve la naïveté intrinsèque à l’engendrement du penser, qu’il apprécie le monde en tant que problème philosophique, concept opérationnel et acte authentiquement créatif. Nous devons donc redécouvrir ce qui est importait tant à Merleau-Ponty et à Deleuze : l’expressionnisme philosophique. Ainsi, reposer la question « Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? » constitue une répétition afi n de penser le problème du monde. Le défiposé par la naïveté contraint le philosophe à admettre lebesoin de réconcilier l’impuissance inhérente à la naïveté avec l’exigence insistante de surmonter cette impuissance d’une manière ou d’une autre et de rendre la pensée possible. Bref, ce texte cherche à dramatiser la manière dont les deux philosophes, chacun différemment, posent la question « Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? » comme une propédeutique à l’ontologisation de la pensée. C’est pourquoi je montrerai que ce qui motive leur insistance à revenir à cette question est le besoin de comprendre leur propre pratique en tant qu’expression d’une sorte d’intuition philosophique – une pure naïveté de la pensée, une stimulation de la créativité – et, ainsi, de saisir l’être du devenir libéré de toute prétention à représenter, communiquer, fi xer l’ontogenèse. Inversement, il faut reconnaître qu’une telle transformation du motif transcendantal de la philosophie requiert de la pratique philosophique qu’elle se place aux marges de ce qui est considéré comme « savoir ».Merleau-Ponty e Deleuze chiedono “Che cos’è la fi losofia?”L’ingenuità del pensiero e l’innocenza della domandaLa filosofia non può non ammettere che il suo insistente riferimento alla “storia sotterranea del problema del mondo” deve portarla ad affrontare le condizionedella sua propria determinazione. In altre parole, la storicità [Geschichte] che guida la filosofia è la storia del “mondo” in quanto esso diviene problematico. Ma questo problematico “‘divenire’ non appartiene alla storia” [Historie]. Implicita nel pensiero di Merleau-Ponty e di Deleuze è la scoperta di una storicità che rifl ette la genesi del problema del “mondo” come il problematico essere dell’ontogenesi. In questo modo, vorrei sostenere che Merleau-Ponty e Deleuze cristallizzano il germe tematico inizialmente formulato da Fink: il problema del mondo forza il pensiero ad affrontare il suo esercizio. Ogni filosofia rimane nuda di fronte alla propria ingenuità quando cerca una riconciliazione col mondo. Ritornando al mondo, un filosofo si ritrova obbligato a mettere il pensiero alla prova di quella stessa ingenuità che lo nutre.Ma, inversamente, il filosofo deve confessare il ruolo giocato dall’ingenuità nel pensiero stesso, nella sua pratica filosofica. Così facendo, lo status filosoficodell’ingenuità resta confermato. Il problema del mondo è il problema filosofico della costruzione di un piano utile a orientare il nostro modo di pensare la relazione fra conoscenza e essere. Con ciò abbiamo identifi cato il parallelismo ontologicoepistemologico che struttura la domanda “Che cos’è la filosofia?”, così com’è posta e affrontata da Merleau-Ponty e Deleuze. Questo saggio, perciò, sostiene che è attraverso la ripetizione da parte del fi losofo del percorso mediante cui il mondo assume lo statuto di un problema ontologico che una soglia epistemologica viene dischiusa. Il mondo esige che il fi losofo trovi questa ingenuità intrinseca per generare il pensare nel pensiero, per considerare il mondo in quanto problema filosofico, in quanto concetto operativo e in quanto atto veramente creativo. Si potrebbe affermare che qui si scopre ciò che è importante per Merleau-Ponty e Deleuze: una forma di espressionismo filosofico. Pertanto, la riproposizione della domanda “Che cosa è la filosofia?” è una riproposizione, per il pensiero, del problema del mondo. La sfida dell’ingenuità costringeil filosofo a riconciliare l’impotenza relativa all’ingenuità con l’insistente esigenza di sormontare quell’impotenza, rendendo possibile, così, il pensiero stesso. In breve, questo saggio vorrebbe ‘drammatizzare’ il modo in cui entrambi i filosofi, in maniere distinte e divergenti, pongono la domanda “Che cosa è la filosofia?”, avviando in tal modo una sorta di propedeutica all’ontologizzazione del pensiero. Vorrei argomentare, dunque, che ciò che motiva la loro insistenza nel tornare sulla questione “Che cos’è la fi losofi a?” è il bisogno, per Merleau-Ponty e Deleuze, di comprendere il loro esercizio come espressione di una sorta di intuizione filosofica, una pura ingenuità di pensiero, uno stimolo alla creatività e, di conseguenza, una maniera per cogliere dell’essere del divenire libero da ogni pretesa di rappresentare, comunicare o arrestare l’ontogenesi. Per converso, riconosciamo immediatamente che una tale trasformazione della sua forza trascendentale richiede che la filosofia e il suo esercizio circoscrivano il proprio luogo ai margini di ciò che la filosofia considera propriamente come “conoscenza”. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty et Deleuze demandent « Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? »La naïveté de la pensée et l’innocence de la questionLa philosophie doit reconnaître que son obligation pressante à l’égard de « l’histoire souterraine du problème du monde » implique qu’elle affronte les conditions de sa propre détermination. En d’autres termes, l’historicité (Geschichte) de la philosophie est l’histoire du « monde » en tant qu’il devient problématique. Mais ce devenir problématique « n’appartient pas à l’histoire (Historie) ». Dans la pensée de Merleau-Ponty (...) comme dans celle de Deleuze, est à l’oeuvre une historicité qui refl ète la genèse du problème du « monde » (image de la pensée) en tant que l’être problématique de l’ontogenèse. Je soutiendrai que Merleau-Ponty et Deleuze cristallisent la thématique qui est déjà en germe chez Fink : le problème du monde contraint la pensée à se confronter à sa pratique. Toute philosophie se trouve comme nue face à sa propre naïveté en cherchant un rapprochement avec le monde. Dans le retour vers le monde, le philosophe est contraint de mettre sa pensée en rapport avec la naïveté qui la nourrit (Husserl en est un exemple). Mais inversement, le philosophe doit admettre le rôle intrinsèque joué par la naïveté dans la pensée elle-même, dans sa pratique philosophique propre. Ce faisant, le statut philosophique de la naïveté se trouve confirmé. Le problème du monde est dès lors le problème philosophique de la construction d’un plan pour orienter notre pensée sur larelation entre la connaissance et l’être. Par là, on a identifi é le parallélisme épistémicoontologique structurant la question « Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? », que posent et à laquelle répondent nos deux philosophes. C’est pourquoi la présente étude soutient que c’est par la répétition philosophique du chemin par lequel le « monde » prend le statut d’un problème ontologique qu’un seuil épistémologique se trouve exposé. Le monde requiert du philosophe qu’il retrouve la naïveté intrinsèque à l’engendrement du penser, qu’il apprécie le monde en tant que problème philosophique, concept opérationnel et acte authentiquement créatif. Nous devons donc redécouvrir ce qui est importait tant à Merleau-Ponty et à Deleuze : l’expressionnisme philosophique. Ainsi, reposer la question « Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? » constitue une répétition afi n de penser le problème du monde. Le défiposé par la naïveté contraint le philosophe à admettre lebesoin de réconcilier l’impuissance inhérente à la naïveté avec l’exigence insistante de surmonter cette impuissance d’une manière ou d’une autre et de rendre la pensée possible. Bref, ce texte cherche à dramatiser la manière dont les deux philosophes, chacun différemment, posent la question « Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? » comme une propédeutique à l’ontologisation de la pensée. C’est pourquoi je montrerai que ce qui motive leur insistance à revenir à cette question est le besoin de comprendre leur propre pratique en tant qu’expression d’une sorte d’intuition philosophique – une pure naïveté de la pensée, une stimulation de la créativité – et, ainsi, de saisir l’être du devenir libéré de toute prétention à représenter, communiquer, fi xer l’ontogenèse. Inversement, il faut reconnaître qu’une telle transformation du motif transcendantal de la philosophie requiert de la pratique philosophique qu’elle se place aux marges de ce qui est considéré comme « savoir ».Merleau-Ponty e Deleuze chiedono “Che cos’è la fi losofia?”L’ingenuità del pensiero e l’innocenza della domandaLa filosofia non può non ammettere che il suo insistente riferimento alla “storia sotterranea del problema del mondo” deve portarla ad affrontare le condizionedella sua propria determinazione. In altre parole, la storicità [Geschichte] che guida la filosofia è la storia del “mondo” in quanto esso diviene problematico. Ma questo problematico “‘divenire’ non appartiene alla storia” [Historie]. Implicita nel pensiero di Merleau-Ponty e di Deleuze è la scoperta di una storicità che rifl ette la genesi del problema del “mondo” (in quanto immagine del pensiero) come il problematico essere dell’ontogenesi. In questo modo, vorrei sostenere che Merleau-Ponty e Deleuze cristallizzano il germe tematico inizialmente formulato da Fink: il problema del mondo forza il pensiero ad affrontare il suo esercizio. Ogni filosofia rimane nuda di fronte alla propria ingenuità quando cerca una riconciliazione col mondo. Ritornando al mondo, un filosofo si ritrova obbligato a mettere il pensiero alla prova di quella stessa ingenuità che lo nutre (come mostra Husserl).Ma, inversamente, il filosofo deve confessare il ruolo giocato dall’ingenuità nel pensiero stesso, nella sua pratica filosofica. Così facendo, lo status filosoficodell’ingenuità resta confermato. Il problema del mondo è il problema filosofico della costruzione di un piano utile a orientare il nostro modo di pensare la relazione fra conoscenza e essere. Con ciò abbiamo identifi cato il parallelismo ontologicoepistemologico che struttura la domanda “Che cos’è la filosofia?”, così com’è posta e affrontata da Merleau-Ponty e Deleuze. Questo saggio, perciò, sostiene che è attraverso la ripetizione da parte del fi losofo del percorso mediante cui il mondo assume lo statuto di un problema ontologico che una soglia epistemologica viene dischiusa. Il mondo esige che il fi losofo trovi questa ingenuità intrinseca per generare il pensare nel pensiero, per considerare il mondo in quanto problema filosofico, in quanto concetto operativo e in quanto atto veramente creativo. Si potrebbe affermare che qui si scopre ciò che è importante per Merleau-Ponty e Deleuze: una forma di espressionismo filosofico. Pertanto, la riproposizione della domanda “Che cosa è la filosofia?” è una riproposizione, per il pensiero, del problema del mondo. La sfida dell’ingenuità costringeil filosofo a riconciliare l’impotenza relativa all’ingenuità con l’insistente esigenza di sormontare quell’impotenza, rendendo possibile, così, il pensiero stesso. In breve, questo saggio vorrebbe ‘drammatizzare’ il modo in cui entrambi i filosofi, in maniere distinte e divergenti, pongono la domanda “Che cosa è la filosofia?”, avviando in tal modo una sorta di propedeutica all’ontologizzazione del pensiero. Vorrei argomentare, dunque, che ciò che motiva la loro insistenza nel tornare sulla questione “Che cos’è la fi losofi a?” è il bisogno, per Merleau-Ponty e Deleuze, di comprendere il loro esercizio come espressione di una sorta di intuizione filosofica, una pura ingenuità di pensiero, uno stimolo alla creatività e, di conseguenza, una maniera per cogliere dell’essere del divenire libero da ogni pretesa di rappresentare, comunicare o arrestare l’ontogenesi. Per converso, riconosciamo immediatamente che una tale trasformazione della sua forza trascendentale richiede che la filosofia e il suo esercizio circoscrivano il proprio luogo ai margini di ciò che la filosofia considera propriamente come “conoscenza”. (shrink)

Since Voltaire’s caricature of him in Candide, Leibniz has had the unenviable reputation of representing the worst excesses of metaphysical rationalism. Bernard Williams once characterized Leibniz’s view that ours is the best of all possible worlds—defining “best” as maximum variety by the simplest laws—as “crass” and “untruthful.” Drawing on the character of Ivan in The Brothers Karamasov, A. W. Moore recently developed Williams’s view, claiming that Leibniz’s system lacks the resources to support a connection between what for Leibniz “matters in (...) the end, and what matters now, to us.” The author attempts to disarm Moore’s objection using Leibniz’s theory of truth and his principle of sufficient reason. More generally he argues that for Leibniz, when it comes to reconciling individual circumstance with the cosmic order of things, theodicy cannot provide any principled substitute for individual effort of will. This tempers the optimism typically associated with Leibniz’s philosophy. (shrink)

This book offers a comprehensive description of how writers, in particular poets in nineteenth-century France, became increasingly aware of the visual element in writing from the point of view both of content and of the formal organisation of the words in the text. This interest encouraged writers such as Baudelaire, Mallarme and Rimbaud to recreate in language some of the vivid, sensual impact of the graphic or painterly image. This was to be achieved by organising texts according to aesthetic criteria (...) so that as far as possible the form of the text as visually perceived would be closely interrelated to its content as reconstructed through the reading process. The result of this development was a radical redefinition of the scope and function of poetry, raising important general questions about the nature of the relationship between language and the visual image that are still very much of concern today. (shrink)

Virtue ethics is one of the three normative approaches to ethics. It foregrounds the virtues or moral character of the individual and can be contrasted with approaches that focus on duties or rules, as in deontological ethics, or on the consequences of actions, as in consequentialism. Virtue Ethics are different from deontological and consequentialist ethical forms. They are related to dispositions. Dispositions, as inner states, precede, condition and have some influence over actions. A disposition is a character type, an habituation, (...) a state of preparation or readiness and a tendency to act in a specified way. Two further issues are relevant to the conception of virtue ethics: notions of causality and free will. The reason why these two notions are important is that in the first case the identification and conceptualisation of the virtues requires a theory of knowledge and of being and the identification of a relationship between the two, including a notion of causation; and in the second case, any ethical theory requires a theory of intention. (shrink)

This paper replies to Fred Ablondi’s discussion of Descartes’s treatment of madness in the Meditations. Against Ablondi’s interpretation that Descartes never seriously takes on board the skeptical hypothesis that he might be mad, because to do so would be for him to undermine the logical thought processes required to realize his agenda in the Meditations, I contend that Descartes does employ madness as a skeptical device, by assimilating its skeptical essentials into the dream argument. I maintain that while Descartes does (...) not use madness to undermine logical processes, he does adduce other considerations that reveal him to be prepared to see those processes undermined. On the question why Descartes abandons madness in the Meditations, I argue that, despite its attractiveness as a skeptical device, the madness hypothesis involves methodological shortcomings that render it unfit for service in the doubt. (shrink)

I argue that, in his effort to overcome causation as an obstacle to agency or free will, Raymond Tallis’ self-described “Humean” re-working of David Hume’s analysis of causation falters on historicotextual and conceptual grounds.

Educational research theorists have accepted that different methods are appropriate in different circumstances: that a multi-method approach is therefore the best option. This has given a spurious legitimacy to the idea that members of the education research community share a common purpose, a common way of looking at educational matters and a common epistemology. The contributors to this book demonstrate that this is far from true. They offer six different perspectives on the relationship that is central to the creation of (...) knowledge about educational systems, institutions and actors: between the knower and what they come to know. They argue that this aspect must be examined whether education research is conceptualized as value-free or value-impregnated. The book moves from a defence of the principle of value neutrality, through a position of partial and context-dependant detachment, to a discussion of post-modern perspectives. Further chapters address the practice of educational hermeneutics, reflexivity in educational research and the need for value introspection in methodology. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Leibniz and the Two ClocksDavid ScottAnyone familiar with Leibniz’s philosophy in general and with his critique of occasionalism in particular is likely familiar with his example of two clocks. Generally speaking, the example illustrates a range of hypotheses that, according to Leibniz, might possibly explain the connections between substances in the world. The most important of these hypotheses are Leibniz’s own doctrine of the preestablished harmony and the occasionalist—for (...) present purposes, Malebranche’s—doctrine of causation. In Leibniz’s mind at least, the two clocks example (so-called because substances are represented by two clocks) illustrates the superiority of the hypothesis of the preestablished harmony over occasionalism. Whether the example in fact succeeds in this regard is the primary question of this paper.Given the times, Leibniz’s choice of example is understandable. A clock is ideally suited to represent a mechanism, of course; and in view of the general “mechanization of the world view” of that time, the example seems to have been in the air.1 Spring-driven clocks had appeared at the outset of the sixteenth century, and the kind of clock Leibniz seems to have in mind in his example, namely, one driven by a pendulum, was the invention, in about 1656, of Christian Huygens, who was a significant influence on Leibniz. Huygens’s invention in fact provided the impetus for a broadening of the importance and extent of horology.2Although Leibniz’s choice of example was understandable, it was not a happy one, and the general importunity of his use of this example was [End Page 445] recognized by both his contemporary critics and his subsequent commentators.3 In fact his choice of the example becomes almost ironic when it is recalled that Geulincx, who is most commonly associated with the example, was an occasionalist. The operations of two clocks, between which there is a constant and fixed relation, say, of keeping the same time, cannot normally be said to be “related.” The example is more intuitively taken to indicate the random, accidental, unnecessary, and unconnected nature of the otherwise constant and regular relation between the clocks; and so one would think the example more suited to an occasionalist’s position than to that of Leibniz.In what follows I aim to judge the effectiveness—in Leibniz’s own terms—of the two clocks example. In gauging the effectiveness of Leibniz’s use of the example, I expect that a few things can be learned about Leibniz’s system in general and about his critique of occasionalism in particular. My procedure will be to examine separately what I take to be four significant occasions in which Leibniz compares things or substances in the world and clocks. The passages in question date from a period spanning ten years, and in each instance the example is put to service in Leibniz’s attempt to better occasionalism.Beyond this, although the comparison is employed or appraised in slightly different ways each time, the uses to which it is put are basically two. In the first two instances examined below, it is employed primarily to distinguish the preestablished harmony from occasionalism. I will be arguing that, to the extent that it fails to illustrate his point, Leibniz fails adequately to distinguish these two doctrines. This was Arnauld’s criticism.4 In the third and fourth instances, however, the example is employed solely to illustrate certain features of the preestablished harmony. On my analysis, it does not appear to fulfill this role either. [End Page 446]First Use of the ExampleOne of the more well known statements of the two clocks example is from an explanation Leibniz gives to Basnage de Beauval in 1696 of his “New System” (1695):Imagine two clocks or watches which are in perfect agreement. Now this can happen in three ways. The first is that of a natural influence.... The second way of making two clocks, even poor ones, agree is always to assign a skilled craftsman to them who adjusts them and constantly sets them in agreement. The third way is to construct these two timepieces at the beginning with such skill and accuracy that one can... (shrink)

In the light of recent writings of Richard Pring, and in relation to the application of empirical research methods in education, this paper offers a corrective to a neo-realist viewpoint and develops a critical realist perspective. The argument is made that the deployment of empirical research methods needs to be underpinned by a meta-theory embracing epistemological and ontological elements; that this meta-theory does not commit one to the view that absolute knowledge of the social world is possible; and that critical (...) realism is the most appropriate meta-theory to underpin the use of empirical research methods. Further to this, unhelpful dualisms between quantitative and qualitative methodologies, and between structure and agency, are discussed in relation to neo-realist and critical realist perspectives. (shrink)

In the light of recent writings of Richard Pring, and in relation to the application of empirical research methods in education, this paper offers a corrective to a neo-realist viewpoint and develops a critical realist perspective. The argument is made that the deployment of empirical research methods needs to be underpinned by a meta-theory embracing epistemological and ontological elements; that this meta-theory does not commit one to the view that absolute knowledge of the social world is possible; and that critical (...) realism is the most appropriate meta-theory to underpin the use of empirical research methods. Further to this, unhelpful dualisms between quantitative and qualitative methodologies, and between structure and agency, are discussed in relation to neo-realist and critical realist perspectives. (shrink)

In this supplement to a work co-authored with André Cresson, David Hume, sa vie, son œuvre, left untranslated until now, Deleuze lays the groundwork for what he will later develop as an “ethics without morality.” Contrary to morality, ethics engenders its general rule for action out of the immanence that grants it the power to affect and to be affected, that is, to increase or decrease its capacity to compose new empowering relations between beings, and between beings and the (...) world. The power to act is synonymous with the capacity to imaginatively create relations, in order to exist. In this way, the imagination reveals its ontological significance. Here we discern Deleuze’s Humean impulse encountering a fundamental Nietzscheanism. The translator’s introduction attempts to make explicit his specific philosophical motive, at this point only formative but, eventually, foundational for his later thought. (shrink)

PIU PUbJlllhollboth invited reviews and unsolicited reviews of new and significant books in . phllolophy. Wo post on our website a list of books for which we seek reviewers, and welcome IdontlOcllltion of books deserving review. Normally reviews are 1000 words.

It is well known that Leibniz's advances metaphysical, logical and moral reasons why monads possess their own force of action; but what is not well known is that he also advances an account of the divine creative act in explicit support of force-endowed monads. This paper's goal is to highlight and critically examine this doctrine of creation, and to contrast it with the doctrine of creation underlying the occasionalist denial that substances possess their own force of action.

Dieser Aufsatz untersucht Malebranches Begriff von der Macht oder Kraft des Willens, die für Malebranche eine notwendige Bedingung der Freiheit ist. Mein Ziel ist, festzustellen, welcher Art genau die Macht des Willens ist, indem ich Malebranches Hauptdarstellungen zu Freiheit, Sünde und Tugend untersuche. Der problematischste Zug dieser Lehre zeigt sich in Verbindung mit Malebranches Okkasionalismus, einer Lehre, die die kausale Ohnmacht aller spirituellen und materiellen Schöpfung zu benötigen scheint und innerhalb derer Gott das einzige kausal wirkende Wesen ist. Wie wirkt (...) sich dieser Grundsatz auf Malebranches Lehre von der Kraft der Seele aus? Welche Art Kraft ist innerhalb des okkasionalistischen Systems zulässig? Malebranches Antworten auf diese Fragen, die ich in diesem Aufsatz kurz darstelle, enthalten eine wichtige Unterscheidung zwischen dem 'Realen' und dem 'Moralischen' oder dem Ontologischen und dem Deontologischen. Ob diese Unterscheidung Malebranche weiterhilft, ist eine Frage, die ich offenlasse. (shrink)

Over the past forty years or so a critique has emerged of a long-standing interpretation of Descartes on the nature of thought. The view being rejected is that Descartes departs from his Aristotelian forbears by “mentalizing” the faculties of sensation and imagination when he includes them under the general category of “thought” and thus completely excludes them from the material domain. I focus on what is arguably the central piece of textual evidence cited in this revisionist case, the eighth paragraph (...) of Descartes’s second Meditation. This passage contains an extensive list of acts that Descartes designates as “thought”: doubting, understanding, affirming, denying, willing or assenting, withholding will or assent, imaging and sensing. I trace the history of this revisionist reading of this list through six modern interpreters of Descartes, and for both textual and philosophical reasons I conclude that this passage provides no support for their interpretation. (shrink)